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Abstract 
The practice of affirmative action has recently been at the vanguard of intense debate 
more than any other time in its forty-year history. A growing number of programs 
including quotas, preferential hiring, minority scholarships, diversity, and reverse 
discrimination have all been linked to affirmative action, which aims to break down the 
wall of segregation that excluded racial minorities and women from the workplace and in 
education. 
Two class-action lawsuits, Gratz v. Bollinger [02-516] and Gnttter v. Bollinger 
[02-241], filed in response to white students being denied admission to the University of 
Michigan's undergraduate and law school program, provided the United States Supreme 
Court with its best opportunity in recent years to focus on the constitutionality of 
adopting such admissions policies. Affirmative action policies are inconsistent with the 
principle of merit (the idea of attaining what you earn) and they penalize an innocent 
person for the alleged crimes of his or her ancestors, effectively known as reverse 
discrimination. Furthermore, affirmative action unfairly rewards minorities on the 
elToneous notion that a minority status automatically equates "disadvantage." In 
conclusion, an additional perspective for the case against implementing affirmative action 
policy within the workplace and in higher education will be presented. 
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Affirmative Action: Equality or Reverse Discrimination? 
Affirmative action is a program that serves to rectify the effects of purportedly 
past societal discrimination by allocating jobs and opportunities to minorities and women. 
Affirmative action programs were an outgrowth of the 1950s and 1960s civil rights 
movements and the Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity legislation of the 1960s. Close to 
fifty years later, the practice of affirmative action has been at the vanguard of intense 
debate more than any other time in its history. Hardly a week goes by that the subject of 
affirmative action does not come up in some context (e.g., in both the private and public 
employment sectors as well as in the educational sphere). A growing number of 
programs including quotas, preferential hiring, minority scholarship, and reverse 
discrimination have all been categorized under this controversial policy; and all 
ostensibly seek to break down the wall of segregation that excluded racial minorities and 
women from occupational and educational placement throughout much of American 
history. 
The analysis of affirmati ve action in this thesis will first consider the changing 
face of affirmative action from all perspectives: race and gender-based as it has been 
applied in private employment, public employment, and higher education. Following a 
glimpse into the definition of affirmative action, the analysis presents a history and 
general overview of affirmative action, including a discussion of the various f01111s of 
affirmative action (e.g., quotas, goals, and preferences); the comis' interpretation of 
affirmative action; the arguments for and against affirmative action; and recent 
developments pertaining to affirmative action. A separate section will include a close 
analysis on the issue of affirmative action in higher education. A concluding section will 
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consider the future of affirmative action and what, if any, other measures could be 
utilized in achieving the goals of affirmative action. 
The Hist0l1cai Context of Affirmative Action 
The term "affirmative action" was first used in its cutTent civil rights context in 
President Kennedy's 1961 Executive Order (EO) 10925, which created the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC established guidelines for 
contractors working on federally financed projects to employ affirmative action in order 
to end discrimination in the workplace (Machan, 1988). John Skrentny, author of The 
Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture and Justice in Am.erica, contends that the 
basic concept underlying affirmative action comes from the English legal concept of 
equity or "the administration of justice according to what was fair in a particular 
situation, as opposed to rigidly following legal rules, which may have a harsh result" 
(1996, p. 6). The first iteration of the term "affirmative action" in United States law or 
policy appeared in the 1935 National Labor Relations Act where it "meant that an 
employer who was found to be discriminating against union members or union organizers 
would have to stop discrimination, and also take affirmative action to place those victims 
where they would have been without the discrimination" (Skrentny, 1996, p. 6). 
The onset of World War II renewed racial, ethnic, and gender tensions (Lynch, 
1997). In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into legislation EO 8802, which 
outlawed discriminatory hiring policies by defense-related industries that held federally 
funded contracts. In its CUlTent usage, affirmative action was born out of the struggle for 
civil rights. In his essay, "The Evolution of Affirmative Action," R.A. Lee (1999) asserts 
that affirmative action is generally conceptualized as being one step beyond the concepts 
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of non-discrimination and equal 0ppOltunity, moving towards a more pro-active stance of 
"anti-discrimination" (p. 393). Citing economist Barbara Bergmann in his book, We 
Want Jobs: A History ofAffinnative Action, Robert Weiss (1997) asselts that affirmative 
action has three main objecti ves: "1) to overcome discrimination; 2) to increase diversity 
within the labor force; and 3) to reduce povelty among groups historically victimized by 
discrimination" (p. x). Lee (1999) presents the following definition of what has become 
an increasingly confusing term: 
It is the 'proactive policy of making special efforts in employment decisions, 
college entrance, and other areas of public behavior as a way of compensating for 
past discrimination. It is based on the thought that certain groups of people, even 
in the absence of current discrimination against any individual member of that 
group, are at a disadvantage in the workplace and on campuses because of the 
effects. of past discrimination against some members of the group. Affirmative 
action is an attempt to 'level the playing field' for whole categories of citizens, 
and the emphasis is on 'disadvantaged groups' rather than injured individuals. (p. 
394) 
Although affirmative action as it developed in the 1960s and 1970s eventually came to 
include anti-discrimination measures intended at a broad spectrum of "protected" 
minorities (including women), the history and the bilth of affirmative action policy is 
firmly rooted in black-white race relations and the struggle for black civil rights. In his 
essay, "A Brief History of the Commitment to Inclusion as a Facet of Equal Educational 
Opportunity," Robert D. Bickel (1998) traces the roots of affirmative action debate in 
education to the late nineteenth century and the rise of black colleges, and 
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correspondingly, the writings and speeches of educated African-Americans (e.g., W.E.B. 
DuBois and Booker T. Washington) (p. 3). Bickel (1998) cites in pmiicular DuBois' 
rejection of Washington's proposal for the "industrial education of the Negro" on the 
grounds that such a program would constitute the creation of civil inferiority (p. 3). 
Bickel (1998) remarks, "by 1942 blacks constituted substantially less than 1 percent of 
graduates receiving Ph.D. degrees, and most of these recipients were trained in black 
undergraduate colleges" (p. 4). The impetus towards affirmation action in education 
suffered through most of the first half of the twentieth century, even as white universities 
gradually felt compelled to admit larger numbers of black students. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, several southern states passed "Jim 
Crow" laws, which were laws that injected racial segregation into virtually every area of 
public life. In the 1896 case, Pless)! v. Ferguson [163 u.s. 537], the United States 
Supreme Court (Supreme Court) upheld the constitutionality of such laws on the basis of 
the "Separate but Equal" doctrine. The Pless)! decision estaBlished the precedent that 
"separate" facilities for blacks and whites were constitutional providing they were 
"equal." Dissenting from the majority'S opinion, Justice John M. Harlan (the elder) 
fervently opposed the Supreme Couii's ruling and instead emphasized that "our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" 
(Stephens and Scheb, 2003, p. 726). The 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brmvn v. 
Board of Education o.fTopeka [347 U.S. 483] ultimately repudiated the "Separate but 
Equal" doctrine, regarding the premise that separate schools were unequal and thus, an 
unconstitutional practice. 
Weiss (1997) maintains, in his research into the history of affirmative action, that 
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government measures directed at ensuring civil rights and nondiscrimination towards 
blacks in the workplace during the first three decades of the twentieth century were 
"largely symbolic" and mainly motivated by demographic pressures created by the large 
migrations of blacks-a factor which put pressure for greater opportunity, if not equality, 
on both industry and education (pp. 31-33). Historians generally consider that the first 
federally mandated affirmative action program was developed in response to the creation 
of the Public Works Administration (PWA) in 1933. The PWA Housing Division, which 
was designed to create low-income housing for urban blacks, also saw an opportunity to 
take advantage of the huge supply of unemployed black construction labor. In response 
to pressure from civil rights proponents in the Roosevelt Administration, the PW A 
Housing Division promulgated the first race-preferential hiring quota. The quotas were 
based on the percentage of blacks in the local labor force, as determined by examination 
of the 1930 United States Department of Commerce Census. Consequently, employers 
who failed to hire the required percentage of black workers would be considered guilty of 
practicing discrimination. Weiss (1997) mentions that the "first PW A project, in Atlanta, 
included a clause affirming that 'the failure of the Contractor to pay Negro skilled labor 
(irrespective of individual trades) shall be considered prima facie evidence of 
discrimination by the Contractor'" (p. 35). 
The outbreak of World War II and the conclusion of the New Deal program 
encouraged blacks to focus on the booming defense industry as a key job target. 
Nonetheless, neither the industry nor the unions that controlled its workers (notably the 
AFL-CIO) felt any compulsion to provide equal or even unequal opportunity jobs for 
blacks. The frustration over the employment situation served as a leading catalyst for the 
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Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons 
(NAACP), which began to coordinate major civil rights protests. Faced with the ensuing 
prospect of a 100,000-strong "March on Washington" by blacks demanding job rights, 
President Roosevelt issued EO 8802, establishing the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee (FEPC) (Skrentny, 1996, p. 29). EO 8802, issued just one week before the 
scheduled July 1, 1941 "March on Washington" rally, obliged the FEPC to enforce new 
federal rules that all training and vocational programs for jobs in defense industries be 
"administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin" 
(Weiss, 1997, p. 37). 
The two-track (education and employment) movement for black civil rights 
converged in the early 1950s over the issue of school segregation. A formative moment 
for the civil rights movement was the Brown v. Board of Education decision wherein the 
Supreme COUlt reasoned "the segregation of public schools as a form of racial isolation 
had a damaging effect on black children" (Bickel, 1998, p. 4), The Brown decision 
permeated the civil rights movement with a sense of legitimacy and gave the civil rights 
organizations a renewed sense of optimism. 
The civil rights and black protest movement steadily grew throughout the rest of 
the 1950s. By 1960, a new radicalism had emerged, as symbolized with the formation of 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (or SNCC, pronounced "snick") (Weiss, 
1997, p. 51). SNCC was a nonviolent civil rights movement mainly devoted to 
supporting their leaders and publicizing their activities in attempting to combat white 
oppression. Moreover the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) also began to strengthen 
its position during this period. Weiss (1997) contends: 
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The 1960s witnessed a transformation of the goals as well as the strategies of the 
civil rights movement. Just as mass protest became as critical to the movement as 
legal actions, demands for specific remedial procedures-often involving the use of 
numbers-supplanted acceptance of vaguely defined ledges of nondiscrimination 
within the movement. (p. 51) 
President Kennedy proved to be a bitter disappointment to most black leaders during his 
first year in office, as civil rights leaders had been led to expect that Kennedy would push 
for a new Civil Rights Act. Kennedy, however, soon made it obvious he that he would 
not be advocating such a bill in the immediate future. Notwithstanding, the movement 
did gain something of a victory through some of the Kennedy Administration's policies 
during the early 1960s. Issued March 6, 1961, Kennedy's EO 10925 proved most 
significant because it prohibited discrimination by employers holding federally funded 
contracts and empowered government agencies to cancel contracts with unions and 
businesses that violated "equal employment opportunities" provisions (Weiss, 1997, p. 
55). Most significantly, EO 10925 was the first civil rights initiative to use the phrase 
"affirmative action." In addition to prohibiting discrimination, EO 10925 stated that 
"affirmative action [would be implemented] to ensure that applicants are employed, and 
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color 
or national origin" (Skrentny, 1996, p. 7). 
Despite the historical importance of EO 10925, the landmark 1964 Civil Rights 
Act (CRA) paved the way for affilmative action, as it is understood in the twenty-first 
century. President Johnson signed the CRA into law in a climate of intensifying national 
racial tension. Title VI of the CRA was directed at enforcing the Brown decision and 
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mandated desegregation of public elementary, secondary, and post-secondary institutions 
and prohibited discrimination in education on the basis or race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. Similarly, Title VII provided for equal employment opportunities by 
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin (Bickel, 1998). 
Notwithstanding, nothing in the 1964 CRA proscribed the development of 
affirmative action programs. Certainly, the CRA was purportedly "color-blind" 
legislation that was aimed specifically and singularly at non-discrimination, and 
particularly at non-discrimination against blacks (Lee, 1999, pp. 393). Although the 
agenda of many of the more radical black civil rights groups had already shifted away 
from purely "color-blind" legislation towards more pro-active anti-discrimination 
policies, the liberal supporters of the CRA who directed its passage emphasized its 
stringent focus on non-discrimination. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minnesota) 
made the following statement ShOlily before the Act was passed in 1964: 
Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing in it 
that will give any power to the [Equal Employment 0ppOliunity] Commission or 
to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a 
racial 'quota' or to achieve a certain racial balance. In fact, the very opposite is 
true. Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion, and 
national origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing. Title VII is 
designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or 
religion. (Lee, 1999, p. 393) 
Despite Humphrey's pronouncements and the ostensibly "color-blind" purpose of the 
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CRA, the civil rights movement had shifted away from non-discrimination and towards 
anti-discrimination by the time of the legislation's passage. In a June 1965 
commencement address at Howard College (a prestigious historically black college), 
President Johnson seemingly signaled a shift in favor of affirmative action: "You do not 
take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to 
the standing line of race, and then say you are free to compete with all the others, and still 
believe that you have been completely fair" (Weiss, 1997, p. 81). 
Three months later, in September 1965, President Johnson issued EO 11246, 
generally considered as the federal action that inaugurated affirmative action (Lee, 1999, 
pp.393-407). Similar to Kennedy's EO 10925, EO 11246 reaffirmed the 
nondiscrimination affirmative action requirements related to federal contractors. 
Additionally, EO 11246 stipulated that contractors had to submit periodic "Compliance 
Reports" and it established the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), a 
division within the United States Department of Labor, to sup'ervise compliance with the 
regulations. One of the first regulations that emerged from the OFCC required that 
"goals" and "timetables" be set for the employment of minority group members (i.e. 
Blacks, Spanish-surnamed Americans, American Indians, and Asians) in job categories 
where they were currently "under-utilized" (Bacchi, 1996, pp. 32-33). Women were 
assigned "minority status" under affirmative action mles in October of 1967 when 
President Johnson issued EO 11375 (Weiss, 1997, p. 104). 
The practice of affirmative action was rarely defined clearly in the first few years 
of its operation. The mle making, administration, and enforcement that were divided 
among several different federal agencies were chaotic and often contradictory. Initial 
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confusion and debate arose over the use of the phrase "goals and timetables." 
Nevertheless, a concern among employers, politicians, and affirmative action opponents 
was that "goals and timetables" was just a clever way of identifying "quotas." The 
United States Civil Service Commission (CSC) tried to dispel these fears with its 
definition and clarification (issued in 1969) which seemingly opposed the use of quotas: 
A 'goal' is a realistic objective which an agency endeavors to achieve on a timely 
basis within the context of the merit system of employment. A 'quota' on the 
other hand, would restrict employment or development opportunities to members 
of particular groups by establishing a required number or proportionate 
representation which agency managers are obliged to attain without regard to 
merit system requirements. 'Quotas' are incompatible with merit principles. (Lee, 
1999,p.397) 
While the use of direct, fixed quotas thus seemed to be prohibited in employment -based 
affirmative action, admissions officers in public universities Had already begun to put into 
the place "minority quotas" for their annual undergraduate admissions by the late 1960s 
and it would not be until 1978 that a clear decision concerning the use of quotas in 
education would be made. 
Judicial Interpretation of Affirmative Action Policies 
In addition to a series of Executive Orders and the proliferation of agency 
guidelines, affirmative action policy in the United States has primarily evolved through 
the executive and judicial branches of government, rather than through the legislative 
branch (i.e., Congress). A comprehensive review of the court cases that shaped the face 
of affirmative action in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s is perhaps beyond the scope of this 
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thesis. Notwithstanding, a brief discussion of a few important Supreme Court decisions 
is crucial in gaining an understanding of affirmative action policies. 
Despite inconsistent and dissent-driven cases, the Supreme Court has played an 
instrumental role in defining and interpreting specific affirmative action policies and 
practices. The doctrine of disparate impact addresses the issues of when employment 
practices are or are not permissible under EEO and affirmative action guidelines. 
Disparate impact was first spelled out through the 1971 Supreme Court decision in 
Griggs v. Duke Power [401 U.S. 424]. In Griggs, black employees at a power company's 
station brought a class-action lawsuit against the company, asserting that it discriminated 
against blacks by implementing a "test" policy. Specifically, this "test" policy consisted 
of requiring a high school diploma or reasonable performance on two standardized test in 
order for employees to qualify for a transfer from the coal-handling department. Prior to 
the enactment of Title VII, Duke Power openly discriminated against black employees by 
hiring them only to work in the coal handling facility; the "test" policy had been 
implemented in the aftermath of Title VII, presumably as a way to keep blacks in the 
coal-handling department and out of the management and administration ranks 
(Dan sicker, 1991, p. 14). 
Supreme Court Chief Justice WalTen Burger, who wrote the decision in the 
Griggs case, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (workers). Burger opined, "[p]rocedures or 
tests neutral on their face ... cannot be maintained if they operate to freeze the status quo 
of prior discriminatory practices" (Dansicker, 1991, p. 14) . Justice Burger further 
established the standard to be used in determining whether or not such a test was 
permissible "[i]f an employment which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to 
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be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited" (Dansicker, 1991, p. 15). The 
Court concluded that the purpose of these requirements (i.e., high school gradation and 
two aptitude tests) was to protect Duke's long-standing policy of providing job 
preferences to its white employees. 
In 1978, the major federal agencies involved in the EEO and affirmative action 
practices issued the "Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures" which 
aimed at providing a framework for the acceptable use of tests and other employment 
procedures. The "Guidelines" established a formula for the "presumption of 
discrimination" and adverse impact: 
The Guidelines presume that discrimination exists whenever the percentage of 
minorities in a company's work force is less than 80% of their share of the 
surrounding population. A selection rate for any race, sex or ethnic group which 
is less than four-fifth (80%) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will 
generally be regarded by the federal government enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact. (Lee, 1999, p. 400) 
Few issues have generated as much controversy in the entire affirmative action debate as 
the use of quotas and "set-asides" (which reserve "slots" for individuals in protected 
categories). Public opinion surveys conducted in the 1960s through the 1990s 
consistently demonstrated that the overwhelming majority (80%-90%) of Americans (of 
all races and both genders) favored "equal opportunity legislation" (Steeh and Kraysan, 
1996, p. 132). These surveys also indicated an overwhelming majority (80%-90%) of 
white Americans (of both genders) opposed the use of quotas and deliberate programs of 
racial preferences in employment settings (Zelnick, 1996, p. 351). Only a minority 
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(25%-40%) of Americans (of all races) favored the use of quotas in college admissions 
(Steeh and Krysan, 1996). 
The Supreme Court has addressed the use of quotas and set-asides in a number of 
cases. One of the primary cases to challenge the public sector use of affirmative action 
policy came in the 1978 Supreme Court case, Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke [438 U.S. 265]. Allan Bakke, a thirty-seven-year-old white male engineer, had 
twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis (Cal-
Davis) and twice was rejected. As part of government mandated set-aside policy, Cal-
Davis reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" 
minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program. Bakke's qualifications 
(Medical College Admission Test score and grade point average) exceeded those of any 
of the minority students admitted for the two years that Bakke was rejected. 
Consequently, Bakke challenged the affirmative action policy of the medical school at 
Cal-Davis on the basis of reverse discrimination (Machan, 1998). The looming issue for 
the Supreme Court to decide was if Cal-Davis violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 
"Equal Protection Clause" and Title VI of the 1964 CRA (which prohibits discrimination 
based on race) by incorporating affirmative action policy into its admissions policy. The 
Supreme Court mled in a 5-to-4 decision that Cal-Davis' quota system was 
unconstitutional and Bakke was entitled to enrollment. The Supreme Court did find, 
however, in a contrasting 5-to-4 decision, that it was constitutionally permissible for 
universities to employ race as a criterion in admission policies (Stephens and Scheb, 
2003). As Skrentny (1996) observed, "In a remarkable compromise, Bakke was to be 
admitted, Davis had to move away from a fixed quota, but treating applicants with regard 
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to race was acceptable" (p. 226). 
Just a year later, the Court began to apply this "compromise view" towards the 
use of quotas in occupational affirmative action programs. The 1979 case of United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber [443 U.S. 193] involved a contractor who had 
implemented a racial quota for admission to a training program as part of an attempt to 
increase the number of minorities. The Supreme Court ruled that such quota programs 
were acceptable as long as "they mirrored the purpose of Title VII, did not trammel the 
interest of white employees or create an absolute bar to advancement, and were used as a 
temporary measure to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance" (Lee, 1999, p. 400). 
Beginning in the late 1980s with the Supreme Court ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Antonio [490 U.S. 642] and throughout the early 1990s, the Supreme Court began to take 
a less favorable view of affirmative action, consistently striking down the use of quotas 
and other fixed preference schemes and increasingly supporting charges of reverse 
discrimination against non-minority applicants. An exception\to the trend was the 
passage of the 1991 CRA which: 
[s]trengthened celiain remedies for intentional discrimination, modified the 
burden of proof in adverse impact cases, and extended certain protection to 
employees of the Congress ... one of the most significant revision was to change 
Title VII from a merely remedial or 'make whole' statue to one that provides for 
compensatory and punitive damages. (Lee, 1999, p. 401) 
During the 1990s, a strong anti-affirmative action movement began to take root in 
Texas, Washington, and California. In 1995, the Board of Regents of the University of 
California made a decision to end racial preferences in admissions policies. The most 
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dramatic move against affirmative action in the 1990s occuned in Califomia. In 
November of 1996, Califomia voters approved Proposition 209 by a margin of 54% to 
46% (Weiss, 1997). The measure, which had attracted the SUppOlt of Califomia 
Republicans and the National Republican Committee, prohibited the state from 
discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to any individual or group based 
on sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting (Chavez, 1998). 
On June 23,2003, the Supreme Court delivered what are likely the most 
important decisions to date dealing with affirmative action. Two class action lawsuits, 
Gratz v. Bollinger [02-516] and Grutter v. Bollinger [02-241], were simultaneously 
reviewed and decided on by the Supreme Court in relation to allegations of white 
students being denied admission to the University of Michigan: s (Michigan) 
undergraduate and law school programs. These two cases provided the Supreme Court 
with its best opportunity to focus on the legality of the issue in the recent past. Prior to 
the 2003 decisions, the undergraduate program at Michigan evaluated applicants on a 
150-point scale. Whereas black, Hispanic, and Native-American applicants received 
twenty points solely for their race, a perfect SAT score of 1600 rendered only twelve 
points. 
The Supreme Court ruled 6-to-3 in Gratz v. Bollinger [02-241] that Michigan's 
race-conscious point system for undergraduate acceptance denied other applicants (non-
minorities) equal protection under the law. Jennifer Gratz, who was denied admission to 
Michigan's undergraduate program, had sued the school on the basis that Michigan's 
implementation of race and ethnicity in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the 1964 CRA. In addition to the 
undergraduate decision, the Supreme Court reversed itself with the 5-to-4 Grutter v. 
Bollinger [02-516] decision in favor of Michigan's law school admissions policy of using 
race as a factor in admissions policy, providing race was not the only factor used. 
Barbara Grutter, who was denied admission to the law school, sued Michigan on the 
same grounds as Gratz. Unlike the undergraduate system, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that using race as a determining factor in admissions provides "a meaningful 
individualized review of applicants" (Will, 2003, A21). In his dissent of the law school 
ruling, Justice Thomas (who was joined with Justice Scalia) quoted a message that 
Frederick Douglass had delivered on January 26, 1865 in Boston, Massachusetts: 
[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I 
perceive, than just, manifested towards us. What I ask for the Negro is not 
benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American people 
have always been anxious to know what they shall do with us. I have had but one 
answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already 
played the mischief with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples will not remain on 
the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, if they are early 
ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! And if the Negro cannot stand on his own 
legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! 
Let him alone! Your interference is doing him positive injury. (Thomas, 2003, 
para. 122) 
Justice Thomas continued in his dissent: 
Like Douglas, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life 
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without the meddling of university administrators. Because I wish to see all 
students succeed whatever their color, I share, in some retrospect, the sympathies 
of those who sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the University of 
Michigan Law School (Law School). The Constitution does not, however tolerate 
institutional devotion to the status quo in admissions policies when such devotion 
ripens into racial discrimination. Nor does the Constitution countenance the 
unprecedented deference the Court gives to the Law School, an approach 
inconsistent with the very concept of "strict scrutiny." Racial discrimination is 
not a permissible solution to the self-inflicted wounds of this elitist admissions 
policy. (Thomas, 2003, para. 123) 
The Supreme Court's split decision of the Michigan cases had the effect of amending the 
Constitution. The newly created legal precedent of "the compelling interest of diversity" 
has superseded the Fourteenth Amendment's "Equal Protection Clause." According to 
Rush Limbaugh, a nationally syndicated radio talk-show host, "University of Michigan's 
law school can now say that people of certain colors can be discriminated against. They 
can now say to certain students, 'You're too genetically and mentally inferior to compete 
on a level playing field, so we're going to give you special preferences.' It's a massive 
insult" (2003, par. 1). The contradictory rulings of the Supreme Court in these two cases 
did not completely resolve whether diversity is a governmental interest that can guide 
publicly funded schools' admissions. The Supreme Court reasoned that the 
undergraduate system resembled too much of a racial quota system, and was therefore 
unconstitutional. Conversely, the Supreme Court upheld the law school's use of race in 
admissions because it employed the term "critical mass" as opposed to "quota." 
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Notwithstanding, it remains unclear why the Supreme Court handed down two 
conflicting decisions without providing a clear rationale, but essentially, these decisions 
have entrenched a racist system of legal preferences. The serendipitous decisions have 
promoted the need for racial diversity at the expense of violating and ultimately 
suspending the constitutional rights of individuals. The Supreme Court has manufactured 
a way for racial preferences to exist. According to Justice Scalia, the rulings are a "split 
doubleheader [that] seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the 
litigation" (Maddox, 2003, para. 13). 
Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
With the exception of the recent Michigan cases, the seminal affirmative action 
case in higher education was the Bakke decision. In his separate decision, Justice Powell 
made the case for the value of diversity in education, while simultaneously striking down 
the use of fixed quotas. Bickel (1998) argues that another Justice in the case, Justice 
Blackmun, took the bold step of challenging the "Court to recognize the moral argument 
for affirmative action" (p. 10). Furthermore, Justice Blackmun opined: "[I]n order to get 
beyond racism we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to 
treat some person equally, we must first treat them differently" (Bickel, 1998, p. 10). 
Despite sharing many of the same features, the affirmative action debate in the 
context of education is fundamentally different from the context in employment. 
Whereas employers are not expected to consider the "moral argument" for affirmative 
action, institutions of higher education are expected to consider such an argument. As 
Justice Powell (Bakke decision) suggested, diversity is regarded as extremely valuable in 
institutions of higher learning. Most public universities and a majority of private 
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universities made a commitment to diversity in their admission policies shortly after the 
passage of the 1964 CRA. While formal quota systems were theoretically abandoned in 
the wake of the Bakke decision, the majority of universities continued to implement some 
type of racial-preferential treatment throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. According 
to a statement made by a Stanford University admissions officer in 1995, "[t]he 
characteristic of race and ethnicity have become paramount" in the selection of 
prospective students (Bunzel, 1996, p. 53). Universities not only have a vested interest in 
ensuring the ethnic diversity of their student body, they are also often swayed by the 
argument that they have a moral obligation to ensure that the marketplace of education be 
inclusive of all ideas which by implication means that it must be inclusive of all people. 
Affirmative action in higher education is perhaps even more controversial than 
affirmative action in employment. The central argument against affirmative action in 
education is that attaining diversity requires an assault on merit (Steele, 1999). Race-
preferential admissions most likely means that candidates with better academic 
credentials (e.g., test scores) will be "passed over" in favor of those candidates with 
lesser qualifications but who have "membership" in the target protected group. Evidence 
has shown a persistent pattern of significantly lower scores for African Americans and 
Hispanics (as compared to Caucasians) and even slightly higher scores for Asian 
Americans over Caucasians. In his article entitled "Race and College Admissions," John 
Bunzel (1996) cites the 1988 figures from the University of California-Berkeley that 
revealed the mean SAT scores for Berkeley freshmen: Asian 1269, Caucasian 1267, 
Latino 1053, and African American 979. Bunzel observes, "they [the scores] do not 
suggest that students of all racial or ethnic groups are held to the same standard" (p. 54). 
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Critics of ending race-preference admissions in higher education suggest that it 
would dramatically reverse the "gains" of the past three decades. According to Bunzel 
(1996), "if admissions were race-neutral, the best estimate is that perhaps only one-third 
of the minority students (excluding Asian Americans) would still get it" (p. 54). From 
the perspective of affirmative action opponents, this would be an impartial outcome and 
consistent with academia's purported focus on merit. Even affirmative action opponents 
such as Harvard University professor Nathan Glazer (1999) acknowledge that college 
admissions have never been run as a pure meritocracy: 
Even before the age of racial preferences, it [admissions policies at the most 
selective universities] took into account not only academic qualifications but also 
such factors as leadership qualities, ability to contribute to athletic teams, alumni 
connections, and special talents. The children of persons of distinction, and in 
state universities perhaps legislators' children, might receive preference. 
'Diversity' considerations also existed, but up until probably the 1950s, this was 
mostly a matter of keeping down the number of Jews. (p. 52) 
Despite the gender-focused character of recent revisions of the CRA (e.g. the sexual 
harassment provisions of the 1991 CRA), gender is rarely viewed as anything but an 
afterthought in the affirmative action debate. Skrentny (1996) contends that his book 
gives no consideration to women and various racial or ethnic groups beyond African-
Americans: 
Though much of the law applies equally to women, the arguments in the scholarly 
articles and mass media almost always center on (black) racial preferences, not on 
gender preferences. More important, women, other groups, and affirmative action 
Affirmative Action 24 
are not explored here because, as we will see, affirmative action developed as a 
model of justice for African-Americans, in response to a stmggle for racial 
equality and a racial cl1sis. (p. 15) 
In her book, The Politics of Affirmative Action: 'Women,' Equality and Category Politics, 
Carol Bacchi (1996) suggested the following after observing affirmative action programs 
and their impact on women in the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, 
Canada, and Australia: 
A quick pemsal of the major theoretical analyses of affirmative action in the 
United States illustrates how often 'women' is relegated to a footnote. The 
common explanation is that the arguments concerning affirmative action are most 
clearly developed using the example of race and that gender raises somewhat 
different, less 'pressing' issues. (p. 42) 
Not only is the history of affirmative action inherently a black history, but it also 
draws from a female historical point of view. Despite the faCt that the "equal pay for 
equal work" campaign had already been launched, few people gave any serious 
consideration to sex discrimination at the time (Bacchi, 1996, p. 41). The passage of the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963, (29 U.S.C. Section 206), which required equal pay for men and 
women engaged in comparable work, may have been presumed by many analysts to have 
"taken care of' working women's more immediate needs (Sass and Troyer, 1999, p. 571). 
Lee notes that it was little more than a bad joke that women were even included in the 
original non-discrimination provisions of the 1964 CRA. Lee (1999) explains the fact 
that the original language of the CRA did not include any reference whatsoever to gender 
was in all likelihood inadvertently inserted by one its most ardent foes-Representative 
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Howard W. Smith (D-Virginia): 
When he [Howard W. Smith] realized the tide was turning against him, he offered 
an amendment to add 'sex' as a prohibited form of discrimination. He may have 
intended this as a 'poison pill,' and he later said it was ajoke, but to his dismay, 
the amendment passed. Thus, women became a protected group, covered by the 
same provisions in housing, education, and employment as 'disadvantaged 
minorities.' (p.401) 
Although the category of "women" was, by the mid-1970s, completely "folded 
into" the affirmative action guidelines and regulations, analysts (both inside and outside 
of government) continued to express doubts about the inclusion of women as a 
"minority." James Scanlon (1992), a former assistant general counsel with the EEOC, 
said the following: 
Few would deny that but for the history of slavery and legally enforced 
segregation that followed, affirmative action would never have become a feature 
of American life. Yet, over the near quarter-century in which the controversy 
over preferential policies has raged in and out of the courts, one of the most 
neglected issues has been the wisdom or propriety of extending such preferences 
beyond the 12 percent of the population that is descended from slaves-not only to 
another tenth or so of the population that is descended from slaves-not only to 
another tenth or so of the population considered to be also disadvantaged 
minorities, but to women, just over one-half of the population. (p. 36) 
Notwithstanding the opposition of Scanlan and others, there is evidence to indicate that 
women "qualify" as an economically oppressed group. In their article, "Diversity 
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Management: A New Organizational Paradigm," Gilbert, Stead, and Ivancevich (1999) 
cite a broad range of empirical studies and surveys that document the persistent male-
female "wage gap"; the under-representation of women in management positions and 
high-paying professional positions; and the concentration of women in low-paying 
occupations (p. 63). 
The Arguments in Favor of and Against Affirmative Action 
Before analyzing the arguments on both sides of the affirmative action debate, it 
would be remiss not to differentiate at the onset between two forms of affirmative action 
as identified by Louis J. Pojman (1998) in his essay "The Case Against Affirmative 
Action." The first form, "weak affirmative action," seeks to promote equal opportunity 
by employing race as a tie-breaker between two equally qualified applicants for 
employment, college admissions, or some other position in society. The goal for "weak 
affirmative action" is equal opportunity to compete, not equal results. The second form, 
"strong affirmative action," applies preferential treatment sol1~ly based on race, while 
ignoring the possibility that the applicant might indeed be less qualified than a non-
minority applicant (Pojman, 1998). Opponents contend that strong affirmative action is 
tantamount to reverse discrimination of individuals of non-minority status. Racism in the 
context of reverse discrimination is comparable to conventional racism. This policy is 
the form of affirmative action cUlTently being advanced under the name "affilmative 
action." 
In spite of obstacles and despite its disadvantages, proponents of affirmative 
action insist that it must be defended because they assert racism and discrimination are 
still commonplace in education and employment. Proponents also insist that equality is 
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not achievable unless preferential treatment is applied to those that have endured 
discrimination and unwelcomed disadvantages (McKenna and Feingold, 1978). 
Affirmative action is justified to counter past discrimination (both privately and publicly) 
against minorities and women in society. 
The first argument in defense of affirmative action policy in the workplace and in 
education is the critical need for role models. Successful minority people will encourage 
and motivate other people of minority status to be confident in knowing that excellence 
can be achieved. Moreover, role models will strongly influence younger people to strive 
for excellence that others "of our kind" have already achieved. 
The argument from compensation insists that victims of past discrimination are 
entitled to preferential treatment as reparation for the harms that have been previously 
committed against them. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. (1996), profe,ssor at Harvard Law 
School, claims, "It [affirmative action] is a small but significant way to compensate 
victims of slavery, Jim Crow laws, discrimination and immigration restrictions" (para. 2). 
By implication, this argument is based on the "two wrongs make a right" assumption 
acknowledging that since some whites once enslaved some blacks, the descendants of 
those slaves are entitled to opportunities, qualification, and compensation for past 
grievances. Proponents are quick to defend the compensation argument by pointing out 
that blacks have not just been the victims of unfair treatment, but more importantly 
"subjected first to decades of slavery, and then to decades of second-class citizenship, 
widespread legalized discrimination, economic persecution, educational deprivation, and 
cultural stigmatization. They have been bought, sold, killed, beaten, raped, excluded, 
exploited, shamed, and scorned for a very long time" (Fish, 1993, para. 5). Furthelmore, 
Affirmative Action 28 
historian Roger Wilkins has noted that of the 375 years that blacks have inhabited the 
United States, 245 years entailed slavery; legalized segregation constituted 100 years, and 
only for about thirty years have blacks enjoyed first class citizenry (PIous, 1996). 
Implementing preferential treatment is a method that can compensate for past and 
ongoing injustices against women and other minorities. Notwithstanding, the 
compensation argument is vulnerable because compensation is only limited to race and 
gender. Hypothetically, a male or female, born poor and white, could be extremely 
disadvantaged, yet under affirmative action would not collect any benefits. Bernard 
Goldberg (2003), author of Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the 
News remarks: 
I'm against affirmative action when it means racial preferences, which in the real 
world is what affirmative action is usually about. Why should the children Jesse 
Jackson or Colin Powell or Diana Ross get some kind of racial preference when 
they apply to college or go out for ajob, but no 'affirmative action' is given to the 
child of a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant coal miner from West Virginia? (pp. 56-
57) 
When society proposes to level the playing field for minorities and women, innocent 
white males, according to affirmative action supporters, are not wan"anted in complaint or 
protest because they have benefited from the unjust discrimination of blacks, other 
minorities, and women. Therefore, it is permissible to award benefits to a less qualified 
woman or minority person. In her essay, "Preferential Hiring," Judith Jarvis Thomson 
(1995) supports reverse discrimination by suggesting that preferential treatment "is 
something the community takes away from [white males] in order that it may make 
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amends" (p. 60). Thus, supporters of affirmative action advocate the elimination of 
discriminatory laws that favor white males at the expense of minorities and women 
(McKenna and Feingold, 1978). 
Those individuals in favor of implementing affirmative action also indicate the 
inequality of results as compelling evidence for an inequality of opportunity (equal 
results argument). In his essay, "The Justice of Affirmative Action," Sterling Harwood 
(1993) further develops this argument as he writes, "When will affirmative action stop 
compensating blacks? As soon as the unfair advantage is gone, affirmative action will 
stop. The elimination of the unfair advantage can be determined by showing that the 
percentage of blacks hired and admitted at least roughly equaled the percentage of blacks 
in the population" (p. 82). The objective of implementing affilmative action is "an 
attempt at redistlibution, an attempt to achieve a limited but nycessary reallocation of 
jobs and income within the existing legal structure. It is part of a long-term civil rights 
strategy to mal(e the law operate as an instrument of social clIange" (McKenna and 
Feingold, 1978, p. 202). 
The leading argument in support of affirmative action policy within society is the 
need for diversity. Those in support of attaining diversity maintain the importance of 
every person coming to appreciate other's culture and outlook on life. Diversity, whether 
in the scope of the workplace or in education, better enables an individual to examine his 
or her principles and beliefs vis-a.-vis other cultures. Barbara Bergmann (1996), author of 
In Defense of Affirmative Action, asserts, "[t]he major justification for affirmative action 
in the workplace is its use as a systematic method of breaking down the current 
discrimination against blacks and women. The desirability of diversity provides the 
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strongest justification for affirmative action in college admissions" (p. 118). Diversity is 
purportedly just another facet of a well-rounded education. A campus environment 
immersed in the diversity of people, ideas, and arguments fulfills one of the essential 
goals of education by developing the mind and the intellect. 
Those individuals opposed to affirmative action policy in the workplace and in 
education claim discrimination is being proposed as the solution to resolving the effects 
of past discrimination. While seeking to help disadvantaged minorities and women, 
reverse discrimination has generally been consigned toward white males. Affirmative 
action was "Originally conceived as a means to redress discrimination, [and] racial 
preferences have [now] promoted it. And rather than fostering harmony and integration, 
preferences have divided the campus. In no other area of public life is there a greater 
disparity between the rhetoric of preferences and the reality" (Sacks and Thiel, 1996, 
para. 2). A significant argument directed against affirmative action is that it imparts 
discrimination on those individuals not covered under its precepts. Specifically, 
discrimination directed at innocent white people only creates another form of 
discrimination. In his essay, "What is Wrong with Reverse Discrimination," Edwin C. 
Hettinger (1997) comments, "Reverse discrimination against white males is the same evil 
as traditional discrimination against women and blacks. The only difference is that in 
this case it is the white male that is being discriminated against. Thus if additional racism 
and sexism is wrong, so is reverse discrimination, and for the very same reasons" (pp. 
305-306). Affirmative action then becomes discrimination-sanctioned law, and under the 
guises of quotas and statistics, reverse discrimination has plagued the productivity of 
businesses. Lisa Newton, in her essay "Reverse Discrimination is Unjustified," contends 
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that if the point of reverse discrimination is to ensure equality for minorities, then which 
minority does one favor (Olen and BalTY, 2001)? Newton further asserts that even if it is 
agreed upon that women and minorities are entitled to special treatment to undo the 
effects of past discrimination, the future practice of affilmative action will still remain 
unknown (Olen and Barry, 2001). 
Another argument in opposition to affirmative action policy is a revision of the 
compensation argument proposed by supporters. Those individuals opposed to 
affirmative action recognize only that individual victims al·e eligible for reparations, not 
the entire class of individuals previously discriminated against. Economist Thomas 
Sowell (who happens to be black) remarked, "[t]hose initially in dire poverty have, over 
the generations, raised themselves to an above-average level of prosperity, by great effort 
and painful sacrifice. Now the deep thinkers come along and ~ant to redistribute what 
they earn to others who were initially more fortunate but less hard working" (McElroy, 
2001, p. 33). Members of a historically discriminated group are in effect not necessarily 
victims; consequently, compensation is not necessal·ily owed. A compensatory justice 
should not apply to the distant descendants of previously discriminated-against groups. 
Furthermore, white men as a class and taxpayers al·e the very ones made to directly and 
indirectly pay for the compensation, yet they al·e not the ones who committed the 
injustices. Opponents of affirmative action contend that no one should pay for the 
reparations because the perpetrators, like the victims, are dead. Glazer, in his essay, 
"Compensation for the Past is a Dangerous Principle," articulates this argument, 
"Compensation for the past is a dangerous principle. It can be extended indefinitely and 
make for endless trouble. Who is to determine what is proper compensation for the 
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American Indian, the black, the Mexican American, the Chinese or Japanese American?" 
(McKenna and Feingold, 1978, p. 205). In their book, "America in Black and White," 
Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom (1997) have suggested that "affirmative action retards 
the progress of blacks: [ ... ] the growth of the black middle class long predates the 
adoption of race-conscious social policies. In some ways, indeed, the black middle class 
was expanding more rapidly before 1970 than after. [ ... ] Many of the advances black 
Americans have made since the Great Depression occurred before anything that can be 
termed 'affirmative action' existed [ ... ] In the years since affirmative action, [the black 
middle class] has continued to grow, but not at a more rapid pace than in the preceding 
three decades, despite a common impression to the contrary" (Elder, 2003, para. 13). 
According to the challengers of affirmative action policy, employing preferential 
treatment generates inefficiency as well as an undermining of plack self-esteem. First, 
affirmative action policy results in loss of profits, decreased productivity, and reduced 
quality in the workplace. Those individuals who have advanced due to affirmative action 
will have contributed to overall inefficiency because they were the less qualified and less 
productive applicants who obtained the positions. According to author Tibor R. Machan 
(1988), the only norm for the economist is "economic efficiency-producing and 
distributing what is in demand at the lowest possible cost. The expanded idea of market 
failure accepts that what is demanded should be produced efficiently" (p. 165). In 
addition to producing inefficiency, affirmative action affects self-esteem. Racial 
preferences serve as a discouragement to minorities because they are labeled as inferior. 
In her essay, "Affirmative Action: The Price of Preference," Shelby Steel (1997) 
comments, "It [affirmative action] indirectly encourages blacks to exploit their own past 
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victimization as a source of power and privilege. Victimization is what justifies 
preference, so that to receive the benefits of preferential treatment one must become 
invested in the view of one's self as a victim" (p. 319). It does not seem too hard to 
imagine an employer quickly promoting women and minorities in an effort to fulfill 
quota standards. Surely when these individuals fail, their failure will be viewed as 
confirmation of their inadequacy. Then again, when some of these people do succeed on 
their own merit, it will be assumed they were the recipients of special treatment. Thus, 
undermining a person's self-esteem can understandably foster resentment. 
The most effective safeguard against discrimination is the very device which 
affirmative action seeks to destroy. A free market system unconstrained by governmental 
control provides one of the best limits against discrimination because profits and losses 
are the ultimate determining factors. Discrimination costs mopey because it alienates 
customers by forcing away their potential business. The free-market system is blind 
toward color and women and it is for this very reason that it can be an effective detenent 
toward discrimination. Affirmative action policies are allowing blacks and women whom 
have advanced on their own merit to be unfairly stigmatized. Consequently, 
accomplishments are going unnoticed in the marketplace. 
The 2003 Supreme Court rulings in the two Michigan cases further entrenched a 
racist system of legal preferences and as a result have diverted the issue of racism from 
people of minority status and consigned it toward whites and Asians. Nonetheless, the 
United States Constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1964 CRA, 
forbids extending an advantage to one group over another solely based on race or color. 
The Constitutional concept of equality of rights wan-ants that all people are created equal 
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and have a right to equal treatment under the law, regardless of their gender, race, or 
national origin. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution states that no state may 
"deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." Thus, an 
individual of non-minority status should expect equal treatment when applying for a job 
or applying for college admission. Yet on June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court in effect 
changed the Constitution and subsequently failed America and the principles that this 
nation was founded upon-that Americans are created equal and that they are entitled to 
the equal protection under the law. 
Employing affirmative action policies in higher education has stigmatized 
minorities as second-rate. Imagine the insult if a black female were told that because of 
her "supposed inferiorities" (i.e., low test scores), she was going to be granted a special 
preference. Consequently, the principle of achieving excellence within higher education 
has been dealt a severe setback. Instead of implementing race-based admission policies, 
colleges and universities should utilize race-neutral means of attaining minority students 
instead of resorting to preferences and reverse discrimination. For example, Florida, 
Texas, and California have implemented a system in which a percentage of top 
performers at all public high schools, even those high schools that are mainly comprised 
of minority students, are assured admission into more prestigious state colleges and 
universities. 
Affirmative action is replete with contradictions because it attempts to attain 
equality through inequality by practicing reverse discrimination on people of non-
minority status. The practice of implementing affirmative action policy might well 
become a cure worse than the disease. Targeting supposedly historically disadvantaged 
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groups (i.e., women and minorities) will undoubtedly further intensify divisions and 
delay hope of a more classless society. What does affirmative action really affirm? 
Based on the flawed assertions coupled with the devastating economic and social costs, 
affirmative action proves to be little more than an agenda for political correctness. 
Affirmative action policies are untenable and an initiative that proves to be imprudent. 
The irony of the June 2003 Supreme Court decisions is that they came on the 40th 
anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.' s "I Have a Dream" speech where he ardently 
proclaimed that his children were to "live in a nation where they will not be judged by the 
color of their skin but by the content of their character" (para. 15). Today's college 
applicants will have to hope that by the time their children are of college age, their skin 
color will not be used against them. Like King before me, I share in that dream too. 
Using affirmative action to eliminate racism establish~s a system of irreversible 
stereotypes. Making a decision on skin color is simply racial discrimination. Diversity 
of skin color is not tantamount to a diversity of viewpoint. People are all different-a 
black person is not automatically a democrat and vice-versa. Similarly, there is no 
Hispanic ideal. Assuming a linkage between diversity of skin color with a diversity of 
viewpoint destroys the fabric of society by erroneously assuming a linkage between 
culture and experience of the minority group. In his essay, "Affirmative Action and the 
American Creed," Martin Seymour Lipset (1995) quotes Washington Post political 
columnist William Raspberry (who happens to be black): "White Americans do not see 
themselves as racists, nor as opponents of equal 0ppOliunity and fundamental fairness. 
What they oppose are efforts to provide preferential benefits for minorities. How could 
we expect them to buy a product we [blacks] have spent four-hundred years trying to 
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have recalled: race-based advantages enshrined into law" (p. 154). Affirmative action 
propagates what it sets out to deny. Higher education is not out to attain diversity; but 
rather colleges and universities are out for the number game, which furthers racism. 
Affirmative action promotes an enoneous view of group rights at the expense and 
exclusion of individual rights. American society has mistakenly looked at the 
"problems" of certain groups of people being historically disadvantaged, in addition to 
sexism and racism, and adopted an enoneous course of action. Affirmative action, though 
having seemingly better intentions earlier in its history, has outlived its purpose. Thus, 
affirmative action policies that are prevalent in the twenty-first century promote 
significant negative consequences with minimal benefits. 
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